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Woo: Starting A Safety Management Culture

Introduction
A strong safety-oriented culture is a key requirement for the implementation of a Safety
Management System (SMS) (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). Therefore, developing and
maintaining a strong safety culture is a critical prerequisite for small flight school organizations
considering the implementation of an SMS. This case study describes how one small flight
school used collaboration and employee engagement to strengthen its safety culture and generate
support for the implementation of an SMS.
SMS concepts, practices, tools, and policies represent the future for safety management
in the aviation industry according to Stolzer, Halford, and Goglia (2008). The definition of an
SMS is “a dynamic risk management system based on quality management system (QMS)
principles in a structure scaled appropriately to the operational risk, applied in a safety culture
environment” (Stolzer et al., 2008, p. 18-19). The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have both developed programs designed to
educate service providers on the need for SMS, as well as strategies for implementing SMS,
because they believe that the SMS concept is important for continued improvement of safety in
the face of increasing aviation system complexity and advancing technology (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2015; International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009).
Given that these important organizations believe SMS is an important component of the
aviation industry of the future, it is critical for future pilots to be knowledgeable regarding their
roles in SMS processes. Therefore, it is important, even for small flights schools, to embrace and
teach SMS concepts to student pilots because what students learn and experience first, will have
a strong and lasting influence on them throughout their flying years (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2008).
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How prepared are smaller flight schools to take on the task of an SMS implementation?
Even more perplexing is how does a small flight school get started if they don’t have a welldefined, policy and documentation-backed safety culture? Stolzer et al. (2008) stress that a
strong safety culture is a requirement for the implementation of an effective SMS and ensuring
the existence of this safety culture is one of the first steps an organization must take when
implementing an SMS.
This emphasis on culture is important because the culture of an organization reflects its
shared beliefs, values, and norms; and an organization’s culture influences the way in which its
people behave (Stolzer et al., 2008). Therefore, it makes sense to ensure the establishment of a
strong safety-oriented culture as one of the key early steps towards implementing an SMS.
The thesis of this article is that identifying a common set of values and goals, along with
a shared sense of purpose regarding the need for a safety culture, can be an effective strategy for
small flight school organizations to overcome resistance to changes needed to transform or
develop a safety culture. The proposed method for achieving this is to engage everyone in the
organization, in a collaborative effort to define the values, purpose, methods, and behavioral
norms needed to meet the safety goals established by the group. The concept of engaging staff at
all levels of the organization, early in the effort to establish new cultural norms, is supported by
multiple studies (Wilson-Donnelly, Priest, Burke, & Salas, 2004; Williamsen, 2007;
Hajmohammad & Vachon, 2014; FAA, 2015). A secondary component of this thesis is that
flight school staff and pilots have an underlying desire to contribute and to participate as
members of a safety-oriented organization, despite the common management concern regarding
organizational resistance to cultural change (Thomas & Hardy, 2011).
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To see if this specific thesis and the existing literature on safety culture development
might apply well to a small flight school operation, a case study at a flight school was developed.
Initial opinion data was gathered through a blind survey instrument. Collaborative discussion
and planning sessions were subsequently conducted in order to gather feedback from staff.
The findings are compared to expectations derived from existing literature on cultural
change, safety management, learning, and motivation to validate the paper’s thesis. The findings
also lead to potential strategies for strengthening the safety culture at smaller-sized flight
schools.
Literature Review
FAA Aviation Circular AC 120-92B describes an SMS as a system “that helps you make
better safety management decisions” (FAA, 2015, p. 5). An effective SMS is built upon four
fundamental structures: “policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety
promotion” (Stolzer et al., 2008, p. 25) designed to promote the active involvement of the
organization’s leaders in safety management; nurture open, safety-related communications both
vertically and horizontally throughout the organization; and ensure that everyone in the
organization embraces safety as a critical component of their job responsibilities (FAA, 2015).
An organization’s top management must document the policies defining and describing
how safety will be achieved. Management must also define the role each member of the
organization holds and how each individual is accountable for fulfilling their role. The
accountability policy must include the organization’s top leadership and their role in ensuring
safety and adherence to SMS policies (Stolzer et al., 2008, p. 25).
The second SMS component, a risk management system, identifies, analyzes, assesses,
controls, and manages safety risks to ensure they are appropriately addressed. Such a system
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must ensure that risks to safety are vigilantly detected and acted upon in a timely manner (Stolzer
et al., 2008).
The third SMS component, a safety assurance system, provides proactive monitoring and
systemic improvement for the SMS through the use of quality assurance tools and methods to
ensure the SMS objectives are achieved. The safety assurance system must measure, track, and
assess the performance of the SMS in order to ensure that the system is effective. Audits,
management review of safety issue resolution activities, and internal analysis and evaluation of
safety policies and procedures all help to ensure the effectiveness of the SMS (Stolzer et al.,
2008).
The fourth component of an SMS, safety promotion, ensures that everyone in the
organization understands their safety responsibilities and knows how to carry out those
responsibilities (Stolzer et al., 2008). Employees, managers, and top leaders must all know the
organization’s safety policies and how to use their associated reporting procedures, risk
management tools, and communications mechanisms. Most importantly, all of the members of
the organization must be trained to carry out their duties in a manner consistent with the
organization’s safety policies and procedures (Stolzer et al., 2008).
The thesis for this article is that there must be a strong, organization-wide safety culture
in order to implement and sustain a successful, effective safety management system because such
a system requires all of the organization’s members to be active participants who share common
goals and accountability for a successful outcome (Stolzer et al., 2008). Safety Management
Systems in Aviation describes the importance of cultural considerations in the implementation of
an SMS and offers a variety of methods for leading efforts to change an organization’s culture
(Stolzer et al., 2008). If an organization’s leaders want to establish SMS, they must understand
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how to develop and implement a safety culture because of “the inextricable tie between a strong
safety culture and successful implementation of SMS” (Stolzer et al., 2008, p. 25). Culture is a
crucial component of any safety management initiative because culture influences people’s
perceptions of what is important, where the power lies within the organization, and what the
expectations are for success (Blair, 2003). “Organizational culture can help or harm safety
efforts. An organization’s culture is more powerful than any individual” (Blair, 2003, p. 18).
Edgar Schein (2010) argues that culture “helps to explain some of the more seemingly
incomprehensible and irrational aspects of what goes on in groups, occupations, organizations,
and other kinds of social units that have common histories” (p. 21). He further clarifies the
importance of culture, when it comes to individual behaviors, by explaining that culture “defines
for us what to pay attention to, what things mean, how to react emotionally, to what is going on,
and what actions to take in various kinds of situations” (Schein, 2010, p. 29). In other words,
culture has a strong degree of influence on how people behave, interact with each other, and
make decisions.
There is strong, consistent support for the importance of cultural factors and the existence
of a strong safety culture when it comes to accident prevention, safety risk management, and
safety management systems as evidenced by the number of works on topics related to this theme
(Lund & Aaro, 2004; Antonsen, 2009; Luria & Rafaeli, 2008; Stolzer et al., 2008). If changing
or evolving the culture to be more safety-oriented is a priority, then it makes sense to understand
how to approach the creation of a cultural change. Antonsen (2009) describes how culture can
be interpreted as being “both a product and a process” (p. 188). In other words, while culture
can shape or influence individual and organizational behavior, it is also the product of the
interaction between the members of the group that embodies it (Antonsen, 2009). This suggests
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that through the use of appropriate group work, cultures can be redefined, changed, or developed.
Furthermore, Edmondson (2002) found that team-based group learning, in an environment that
was psychologically safe and interactive, fostered progress on organizational goals. In summary,
“culture change will not occur without the involvement, commitment, and active support of
organization members throughout the entire organization” (Cameron & Quinn, 2006, p.103).
Cameron and Quinn (2006) emphasize that too often, organizations that attempt to improve in
some manner, fail to take the time and make the effort to develop a common viewpoint among
employees about where the organization currently stands, and what it needs to achieve in the
future.
In addition to the establishment of a strong safety-oriented culture, senior management’s
commitment to SMS-related programs is essential. Management must learn the comprehensive
costs and benefits associated with both accidents and safety programs. Management must also
understand their role in encouraging safety as a valued component of the organizational culture
(Friend & Pagliari, 2000).
Kotter (1996) provides a comprehensive approach to leading and managing
organizational change that sets the stage for developing this common viewpoint. Key points in
Kotter’s model include establishing a sense of urgency regarding the need for change, creating a
guiding coalition, developing a vision and a strategy for change, and empowering employees for
broad-based action (Kotter, 2008; Kotter, 1996).
The creation of a sense of urgency is an important starting point for leading a cultural
change. Kotter emphasizes that “a true sense of urgency is rare … [and] it has to be created and
re-created” (Kotter, 2008, p.15). Kotter expands on this point by describing his observations of
how challenging it is for organizations to sustain change initiatives because the urgency tends to
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wane over time – especially if they have experienced a few successes with their initial efforts
(Kotter, 2008). The implication is that the small flight school organization must find methods to
keep the staff engaged in growing the safety culture because the energy that currently exists
within the organization, to address safety improvement opportunities, will likely dissipate over
time unless efforts are made to renew the sense of urgency.
The drive for this continually renewed sense of urgency comes from leadership exhibited
not only at the top, but throughout the organization (Kotter, 1996). While senior level
management will have to define the cultural tone by exhibiting both leadership and commitment
to the establishment of a safety culture (Stolzer et al., 2008), Kotter (1996) suggests that top level
management must also find ways to create leaders with shared vision at all levels of the
organization to continually renew the sense of urgency around the organization’s change
initiatives. Kotter states that “the primary function of leadership is to produce change, and if a
culture encourages that activity throughout the hierarchy, it will produce a great deal of risk
taking, initiative, communication, and motivation” (Kotter and Heskett, 1992, p. 45).
Enabling leaders at all levels of the organization can result in inspiring everyone to
collaborate and lead. This type of organizational interaction has many parallels to the idea of a
self-directed team. The concept of a self-directed, cultural evolution initiative is further
supported by Margaret Wheatley’s work on self-directed organizational change in which she
finds that “if the work of change is at the level of an entire organization or community, then the
search for new meaning must be done as a collective inquiry” (Wheatley, 2006, p. 148).
Wheatley maintains the concept of finding a new meaning is important because people need to
have the opportunity “to explore an issue sufficiently to decide whether new meaning is available
and desirable” (p. 148) before they can embrace change.
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Ballesteros (2007), Reason (2008), and Argyris & Schön (1996) also talk about the
importance and relevance of organizational learning in the context of implementing and guiding
cultural change. This is relevant because in their descriptions of the organizational change
dynamics, the pool of change agents is not confined to a few selected leaders. This is consistent
with Wheatley’s call for engaging the organization. Winterberger (2010) also emphasizes the
importance of engaging expertise from all parts of the organization for input on the analysis and
implementation of safety. In the small flight school environment, this emphasis translates to the
need to engage everyone.
Simon and Cistaro (2009), also cite the importance of engaging employees during efforts
to transform a safety culture. It helps to create transformational leaders and champions at all
levels of the organization consistent with Kotter’s (1996) approach to leading change. Similarly,
Hajmohammad and Vachon (2014) described the importance of building individual commitment
through empowerment and participation to establish a safety-oriented culture. It is an additional
perspective highlighting the relevance of collaboration across the entire organization.
Collaborative development of new meaning and organizational learning can integrate
opposing viewpoints on the development of a strong, organizational culture as described by
Reason (1997) in his chapter on engineering a safety culture. Reason summarized the various
approaches to changing an organization’s safety culture to being either a management-driven
change to an organization’s practices, or a collective shift in the integrated individual and group
values, beliefs, and behaviors. Though Reason favors the management-driven approach to
cultural change, it seems possible that combining the two approaches, by engaging staff at all
levels of the organization as change leaders and managers, would achieve both objectives of
Reason’s approaches and improve the effectiveness of the change. The entire staff would
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potentially have insight, ownership, and clarity regarding the change and the need for the change.
Such a process would result in organizational learning and better acceptance of any procedural
change by energizing the staff around the new meanings they have collaboratively developed
(Wheatley, 2006).
The collaboration process would also facilitate the development of three basic conditions
for the growth of a safety culture: trust, commitment, and understanding of the flight school’s
non-punitive safety management initiative (McCune, Lewis, & Arendt, 2011). The
establishment of these basic conditions would further enable the staff to accept safety-related
changes at the flight school.
Before the concept of organizational learning is accepted as the best or only path forward
for achieving organizational culture change, it should be noted that Argyris & Schön caution that
organizational learning can produce unintended results such as destructive learning (Argyris &
Schön, 1996). Careful preparation and monitoring must be incorporated into the process of
leading organizational learning to prevent such an outcome from occurring.
Methodology
The existing literature consistently describes how a well-developed safety culture is a
prerequisite for the successful implementation of an SMS within a given organization. The
literature also reviews key concepts regarding methods and requirements for the development of
a safety-oriented culture. In order to test the applicability of concepts found in the research, a
small flight school was selected to conduct a case study.
A 14-question blind survey, distributed to everyone in the company, including the
company owners, solicited information on their beliefs and perspectives of safety at the flight
school. The survey attempted to identify potential sources of resistance and potential sources of
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motivation for moving forward with change initiatives to strengthen the flight school’s safety
culture. According to Williamsen (2007), Dan Petersen, a well-known safety expert and thought
leader, recommends the use of a survey as an excellent method for gaining insight into the safety
culture perceptions, beliefs, and opinions of people at all levels of an organization. After the
survey collected initial information from the staff, follow up meetings were held to engage
employees in collaborative working sessions to define how to move forward with the further
development of the safety culture.
The survey results were reviewed with the staff members at meetings for the purposes of
validating the aggregate data and determining the level of support regarding the outcomes. The
staff meetings were initiated with strict ground rules that were enforced to preclude judgmental
commentary. People were encouraged to explore all sides of any questions or issues that
emerged with a promise from the senior management team that no performance or attitude
judgments would be made. The survey outcomes were also discussed with small groups of staff
in casual, private follow up meetings, where no management was present, to see if different
concerns or perspectives would emerge. It was anticipated that this combination of interactions
would work because of the trust and integrity the researcher has established with the staff
through previous polling efforts.
The resulting conversations were energetic and productive resulting in a consensus to
move forward with further brainstorming and planning around the implementation of an SMS.
Once an initial plan of action was produced, follow up individual interviews were conducted
with every employee, from top management on down, to identify barriers and concerns about
future efforts to strengthen the school’s safety culture and improve its safety management
practices.
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Case Study Background
The flight school used for this case study operates a fleet of 14 aircraft and has a staff
consisting of 12 flight instructors, two dispatchers, two managers, and two administrative staff.
This flight school also serves as the flight training operation for a local college’s professional
aviation program.
The drive to implement an SMS for this small flight school stems from external pressure
by the local college. The aviation department at this college has mandated the implementation of
an SMS for consistency and alignment with its curriculum.
The flight school’s management team, which includes the owner, is willing to implement
an SMS to satisfy the college’s demands; however, some of the flight school’s staff felt the need
to adopt additional safety-oriented practices, especially those associated with a formal SMS
process, was not urgent. Their concern stemmed from assumptions made with respect to the
potential for extra documented work and excessively rigorous operating practices. They
believed that excessive rigor could impose unreasonable constraints and unnecessary inefficiency
on the training process. These concerns were based on assumptions formed during staff
discussions on safety practices and procedures the company had considered as a means to fulfill
the college’s SMS requirement. Therefore, defining a strategy to address these resistancegenerating concerns was an important first step.
The rationale for focusing on the development of a safety management culture for this
small organization is derived from the definition of an SMS. Stolzer et al. (2008) emphasize that
successful implementation of an SMS is tied to the organization’s commitment to operating with
a strong safety-oriented culture. The existence of an established safety-oriented culture is
characterized by a shared, clearly-defined, and consistent set of values, operating practices, and
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behavioral norms oriented towards safety (Stolzer et al., 2008). This suggests that attempting to
implement an SMS is likely to result in failure if the organization does not have well-defined,
shared values, beliefs, and behavioral norms regarding safety management.
Implementing cultural change at this flight school is entirely realistic given its size and
nature. It is a small family-owned and operated business. The instructors, who generally are not
family members, have bonded well with both the management team and with each other. They
have also repeatedly expressed commitment to making the flight school a premium quality flight
training organization.
A few years ago, a highly regarded member of the flight school’s community perished in
a tragic accident. This traumatic loss united the staff and triggered the review and discussion of
the flight school’s safety practices. While a number of concepts and proposals were discussed,
only a few have been implemented. Informal staff interviews suggest there is an interest in
instituting a more formal and systematic approach to safety, but there is also a mixed sense of
urgency regarding any large-scale immediate actions. Those who expressed concern about
implementing a more systematic approach to safety tend to feel such highly structured safety
programs are most appropriate and feasible for larger air carrier operations. Additionally, most
of the staff believes the flight school already has a strong, practical, safety-oriented culture.
Understanding and working through these obstacles to cultural change is a key requirement for
successful, further development of the flight school’s safety culture.
Survey Results
The survey was completed by 33 respondents. The entire staff of 18 at the flight school
completed the survey. Fifteen of the respondents were flight school students or rental customers.
Since little correlation and no significant patterns of data were found among the non-staff
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respondents, the data analysis was focused on the staff responses. Ultimately, the safety culture
will be defined by the flight school’s community-wide beliefs and behaviors; however, the flight
school staff must establish themselves as a unified body of leaders and champions for safety first.
The survey results, in combination with staff discussions and qualitative data gathered
from follow-up staff interviews, suggest the staff at the flight school can potentially be inspired
and motivated to further develop a safety-oriented culture. Though the initial data gathered by
the survey suggests there may be some resistance to changing the current culture, qualitative data
gathered from individual staff interviews near the end of the study revealed subsequent
commitment by all employees to improving safety and safety management practices.
In general, the staff believes safety is a core value for the organization and learning more
about professional safety management practices will be beneficial to their aviation careers as
shown in Table 1 and Table 2 below. The two neutral responses in Table 2 were submitted by
flight instructors. Neither of these two flight instructors were high total time [greater than 3,000
hours’ experience] pilots. The management team members are all high-time pilots; therefore, the
neutral responses do not reflect the beliefs of management at this flight school.

Table 1
The Number of Staff Who Believe Safety is a Core Value at this Flight School

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly agree
Total
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1
0
0
7
10
18

Percent
5.5
0.0
0.0
38.9
55.6
100.0

13

Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 24, No. 3 [2015], Art. 1

Table 2
The Number of Staff Who Believe Learning More About Safety is Relevant to Their Career

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly agree
Missing
Total

Frequency
0
0
2
8
7
1
18

Percent
0.0
0.0
11.1
44.4
38.9
5.6
100.0

Table 3 shows there are staff members who do not believe additional safety management
discipline and follow-through are needed. Five staff members, who are flight instructors,
disagree or strongly disagree with the need for more safety discipline at the flight school. Table
4 shows these five staff members also believe the flight school already has a culture in which
safety is consistently practiced and reinforced.
Table 3
The Number of Staff Who Believe More Safety Discipline is Needed

Strongly disagree

Frequency
1

Percent
5.5

Disagree

4

22.2

Neutral

7

38.9

Agree

3

16.7

Strongly agree

3

16.7

Total

18

100.0
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Table 4
Breakdown of Staff Who Responded “No Additional Safety Discipline is Needed” and Their
Beliefs Regarding “Safety is Consistently Practiced and Reinforced as Part of the Culture”

Agree
Strongly agree
Total

Frequency
2
3
5

Percent
40.0
60.0
100.0

However, Table 5 shows that the majority of the staff agree that it makes sense to
implement additional safety management practices, even if it results in new reporting and
recordkeeping procedures. This suggests that there are no substantial staff barriers to the concept
of implementing new, additional safety management practices.

Table 5
The Number of Staff Who Believe Implementing Additional Safety Management Procedures
Makes Sense

Strongly disagree

Frequency
0

Percent
0.0

Disagree

0

0.0

Neutral

3

16.7

Agree

9

50.0

Strongly agree

6

33.3

Total

18

100.0

While the majority of the staff is willing to consider new safety management practices,
Table 6 suggests the staff have varied views on the level of trust in the company when it comes
to protecting the identity of people who submit reports on safety hazards, errors, and issues.
Table 7 depicts the staff’s varied opinions regarding the openness of other people in the flight
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school’s community to admit to procedural errors and to take the time to submit safety issue
observation reports.
Table 6
The Number of Staff Who Trust the Company to Protect Their Identity as a Safety Report
Submitter

Strongly disagree

Frequency
0

Percent
0.0

Disagree

0

0.0

Neutral

4

22.2

Agree

6

33.3

Strongly agree

8

44.4

Total

18

100.0

Table 7
The Number of Staff Who Believe Implementing a Formal Safety Management Program Will Be
Difficult Because People Will Be Reluctant to Participate

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly agree
Total

Frequency
1
7
6
4
0
18

Percent
5.6
38.9
33.3
22.2
0.0
100.0

Despite the concerns expressed by some of the staff about the willingness of other people
to participate in voluntary safety issue reporting and safety management procedures, Table 8
reveals that none of the staff indicated they would refuse to submit safety reports to the
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company. Over 66% of the staff said they would participate actively in a voluntary safety hazard
and error reporting program.
Table 8
The Number of Staff Who Indicated They Would Contribute Safety Reports Themselves

Strongly disagree

Frequency
0

Percent
0.0

Disagree

0

0.0

Neutral

6

33.3

Agree

3

16.7

Strongly agree

9

50.0

Total

18

100.0

Finally, while the small sample size of 18 responses makes it difficult to generalize these
findings outside of this case study, it appears as if there is some correlation between the years of
experience as a pilot and a staff member’s belief in the need for additional safety discipline at the
flight school. Figure 1 suggests that some of the newer staff pilots believe that the current level
of safety discipline is already adequate. Also, the staff with the strongest belief in the need for
more safety discipline had the most years of experience as a pilot.
Examination of the relationship between hours of flight experience and beliefs regarding
safety revealed no discernable correlation. Perhaps this is related to the general aviation
environment; however, no data are available to explain the difference between years of
experience and hours of flight time when it comes to their relationship to the beliefs above.
These observations are tempered by the lack of a strong, significant correlation between years of
piloting experience and the belief that more discipline is needed. The Pearson R is 0.425 and it
was not significant at the 0.05 level.
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1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree
Pilot Years: 1= 0-1 year, 2= 1-3 years, 3= 3-5 years, 4= 5-10 years, 5= more than 10 years

Figure 1. Scatter plot of responses to the survey question asking if more safety discipline and
follow-through is needed at this flight school. The linear projection is based on a simple linear
regression of the scatter plots. The numbers in the rectangular boxes represent each actual data
point. Multiple boxes with the same number surrounding a circular point means that multiple
responses were recorded for that combination of pilot years and response value.

Discussion
The literature on driving change in the culture of an organization emphasizes the
importance of leadership and inspiring a sense of urgency. It also emphasizes the importance of
stimulating leadership at all levels of the organization. In small organizations, the implication is
the use of collaborative workgroups, that engage everyone, may produce the most energy and
commitment to generating the organizational changes needed to grow the safety culture. In a
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small organization, engaging everyone is relatively easy to do. It is much more difficult to
achieve that in a large organization.
In the small flight school organizational environment, the entire staff has clear visibility
regarding the attitudes and behaviors exhibited by each other. As more and more of the staff
adopt certain specific behaviors, new social norms will emerge and these will often be more
influential than any single person’s attitude or behavior (Lund & Aaro, 2004). This is critical
since the existence of a strong safety culture is a prerequisite for the implementation of a safety
management system (Stolzer et al., 2008).
The data collected in the case study survey suggest some resistance to the introduction of
more formal safety management discipline may have existed at the time of the survey. Table 3
shows more than half the staff members have neutral or negative opinions about the need to
implement more safety discipline. Only six staff members feel more safety discipline is clearly
needed. Collective inquiry, in the form of a collaborative effort to define future safety strategies,
should be considered as an approach for understanding the true meaning of this result (Wheatley,
2006). Though seven staff members were neutral on the need for more safety management
discipline, their lack of a sense of need suggests they may be content with the status quo. This
may indicate complacency in which opportunities for improvement are recognized, but actions to
implement changes are deferred indefinitely (Kotter, 2008). In fact, the flight school had been
discussing and deferring the implementation of SMS and of other culture-altering initiatives for
some time. Kotter (2008) states that “a real sense of urgency is rare, much rarer than most
people seem to think” (p. 9) and he maintains that a sense of urgency is needed to drive out
complacency so change and culture development can proactively occur.
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Five staff members did not agree additional safety management reporting and/or new
safety management practices are needed per the initial survey. These may or may not be
individuals who were reluctant to take on additional safety management tasks. It is interesting to
note that all of the flight school’s employees, including these five flight instructors, believe the
flight school does a good job promoting and driving safety already. These staff may have felt
that the flight school’s current safety practices were good enough and more discipline was not
required at the time they answered the survey.
By the end of the study period, 100% of the staff agreed to support and participate in the
identification and development of improved safety management processes and tools during oneon-one interviews. Some stated their initial apprehension was relieved once they understood
they would have the opportunity to help shape and define any new policies and procedures.
Therefore, no obvious barriers, within the flight school’s organization, are standing in the way of
efforts to start building a stronger safety-oriented culture. The same is true for the
implementation of a safety management system based on the final qualitative inputs gathered
from individual interviews at the end of the study – as long as everyone had an opportunity to
participate in the development of the new strategies, procedures, and expectations. The
weakness of this conclusion is the possibility that individual responses were different from those
collected by the survey because of the in-person nature of how the final attitudes were collected.
Informal post-study observations appear to support the more positive result of employee
willingness to engage in the cultural change process.
There was some skepticism and concern within the organization regarding the work
required to implement such a system and there were some trust concerns regarding how the data
would be used. Therefore, the approach for implementing an SMS in this small flight school
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organization must be designed carefully. However, the qualitative input sections of the survey
collected a variety of ideas for refining the safety management policies, assuring the continuous
improvement of safety practices, and promoting safety through seminars, messaging, and
emphasis of safety considerations. Most significantly, by the end of the study, all employees
expressed a desire to help evolve the school’s safety culture and practices.
It is possible that some of the concern about the imposition of new work and process
demands may have been the result of a perception that the SMS had been mandated upon the
company without good reason. Some of the freeform text comments that accompanied the
questionnaire responses imply this. This is an important consideration for organizations working
to change their safety culture. Engaging everyone in a small organization, in the collaborative
learning and development process, can potentially ward off concerns that might otherwise
develop if the same ideas are externally imposed on them. The literature on creating effective
change in an organization’s culture suggests that a participative and collaborative approach to
identifying a common set of goals, perspectives, and strategies for achieving a stronger safetyoriented culture could work well in smaller organizations such as the one described in the case
study.
In a smaller-sized organization, such as the flight school in this case study, large portions,
if not all of the staff can potentially participate in the culture change tasks. The sense of urgency
for the case study flight school was established by the combination of a tragic accident and the
demand from the local college that an SMS be implemented soon. That sense of urgency now
needs to be cultivated and renewed so that it is sustained and is meaningful to future staff who
may question the need for an increased level of safety discipline. This essentially means
imbedding the sense of urgency into the culture (Kotter, 2008). The other components of
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Kotter’s change methodology can be adapted to leading the cultural change initiative in an
inclusive and collaborative way that creates both buy-in and common understanding regarding
the changes developed by the collective organization.
Creating change in this kind of collective and collaborative manner will ensure that
everyone in the flight school is at least aware of the key guiding values, priority goals, and
standard approaches and methods for achieving the school’s safety goals because everyone will
have contributed to the definition of the goals and methods. Such an approach will also generate
opportunities for both individual learning and organizational learning. The opportunity for
learning about safety practices and SMS concepts can be an incentive for participating in the
process in a small flight school environment. Many flight instructors, in such an environment,
have career aspirations that will be well-served by knowledge of SMS concepts and SMS
implementation challenges. In the case study, there was clearly an interest on the part of the
flight instructors to learn more about safety practices and SMS concepts.
These ideas align well with the observation that an organization that has an effective
SMS in place will also display the characteristics associated with having a learning culture
(Stolzer et al., 2008). Continuous learning, improvement, and collaborative efforts to identify,
analyze, and manage risk are all fundamental components of both an SMS and a safety culture.
To test whether or not the literature-based position on collaborative, learning-oriented
approaches to developing a safety-oriented culture may be applicable in the small flight school
environment, follow up discussions were held with small groups of the staff as well as with
individual staff members. The results of these conversations were consistent and unanimous
regarding the interest, enthusiasm, and importance of engaging all of the staff in collaborative
workshop-like sessions to provide both learning opportunities and culture-defining opportunities
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regarding safety and SMS implementation activities. By the end of this case study, everyone
from the top level management ranks to the most junior staff members expressed interest in
being part of the process and contributing to improved safety management. This is remarkable
given the fact that some degree of concern was expressed in the survey results and given that
100% of the staff believed the flight school already had a safety-oriented culture.
Conclusions
The key conclusions of this study are that small flight school organizations may well
have the opportunities to effectively develop a stronger safety-oriented culture and to implement
an SMS that is structured in manner appropriately scaled to their operational risks. Based on the
case study conducted for this article, the use of a survey instrument, and frank, open-group
discussions, to determine the potential barriers and obstacles to undertaking such an effort will
be helpful for engaging the staff.
The literature emphasizes the importance of a strong and consistent management
commitment to establishing both a safety-oriented culture for the organization and a safe climate
for the staff to define, collaboratively develop, and learn about the new standards, processes, and
practices that form the new culture (Wilson-Donnelly et al., 2004). Also, ensuring the existence
of a strong safety culture is a critical early step in the process of implementing an SMS.
The literature-defined approaches appear to be effective within the context of the case
study used for this article. The use of widespread engagement and empowerment of the entire
staff to develop its safety culture seems to have mitigated early concerns expressed in the survey
results. Additionally, it appears as if everyone employed at the flight school is genuinely
interested in contributing to the ongoing improvement of safety at the school. The case study
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flight school now has an engaged staff that is eager to move forward with the organizational
learning and collaborative SMS development effort.
Recommendations
The findings of this article and the use of the case study as a means of applying the
existing research provided promising results. It is recommended that a broader study be
conducted to determine how well these findings can be generalized in the small flight school
environment.
Separately, it is also recommended that flight schools choosing to undertake an initiative
to strengthen their safety culture and to implement an SMS, heed Kotter’s advice regarding the
need to create a sense of urgency around why such an initiative makes sense. The flight school
in the case study experienced varying levels of proactive effort over the past two years in terms
of executing on this initiative. Kotter reminds us that “a true sense of urgency is rare … [and] it
has to be created and re-created” (Kotter, 2008, p.15). It will not sustain its intensity on its own.
Therefore, the management and the culture must continually work to renew it.
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Appendix
Survey Questions:
Please place an X in one answer box for each of the following questions. An optional
comment area is included for each question if you feel you need to clarify your response. It is
expected that the comment area will be blank in most cases.
1.

Safety is a core value that is presently taught and emphasized here.
□ Strongly Disagree

□ Disagree

□ Neutral

□ Agree

□ Strongly Agree

Comments:

2.

Safety is consistently practiced and reinforced as part of our culture here.
□ Strongly Disagree

□ Disagree

□ Neutral

□ Agree

□ Strongly Agree

Comments:

3.

More safety management, discipline, and follow through are needed here.
□ Strongly Disagree

□ Disagree

□ Neutral

□ Agree

□ Strongly Agree

Comments:
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4.

I would be an active contributor of safety hazard and error observations if we had a
trustworthy, anonymous safety report submission system.
□ Strongly Disagree

□ Disagree

□ Neutral

□ Agree

□ Strongly Agree

Comments:

5.

Learning more about professional safety management practices and operating procedures
would benefit my aviation career interests.
(Leave blank if you have no professional career interests in aviation)
□ Strongly Disagree

□ Disagree

□ Neutral

□ Agree

□ Strongly Agree

Comments:

6.

Implementing additional safety management practices, designed to uncover safety hazards
that are not currently being addressed, makes sense – even if it requires new reporting and
record keeping procedures.
□ Strongly Disagree

□ Disagree

□ Neutral

□ Agree

□ Strongly Agree

Comments:
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7.

I would be more likely to participate in a safety issue reporting program if I were given the
opportunity to help define and shape that program.
□ Strongly Disagree

□ Disagree

□ Neutral

□ Agree

□ Strongly Agree

Comments:

8.

I trust the company to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of the safety hazards,
errors, and issues I’ve observed and submitted to the safety management program for
analysis and improvement action.
□ Strongly Disagree

□ Disagree

□ Neutral

□ Agree

□ Strongly Agree

Comments:

9.

Implementing a stronger safety culture and a formal safety management program will be
difficult here because people won’t admit to procedural errors or spend the time to submit
safety issue observations reports – even if the system protects their anonymity.
□ Strongly Disagree

□ Disagree

□ Neutral

□ Agree

□ Strongly Agree

Comments:
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10.

List the top one to three ideas you have for encouraging the management, staff, and pilots to
consistently support safe flying.

I would like to
participate in
setting this up

Describe your idea(s) below
1.

Y / N

2.

Y / N

3.

Y / N

Comments about implementing a more formal approach to managing safety here:
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
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A.

Describe your role or position here: (check all that apply)
□ Student □ Rental Customer

□ Flight School Staff

□ Other (describe below)

Comments:

B.

How long have you been a pilot?
□ 0 – 3 years □ 3 – 5 years

□ 5 – 10 years

□ 10 or more years

□ Not Applicable

Comments:

C.

How many hours of total time as a pilot do you have?
□ 0 - 100

□ 100 – 500

□ 1,500 – 3,000

□ 500 – 1,500
□ 3,000 – or more

Comments:

D.

How long have you been employed here?
□ 0 – 1 years □ 1 – 3 years

□ 3 – 5 years

□ 5 or more years

□ Not Applicable (not employed here)

Comments:
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